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I think it was be 96
Let the pirates in order of seniority be A, B, C, D, E
The first captain wld be A. First he would propose that he takes 98 and give 1 each to C and E (as mentioned in the solution)
In this case, B would tell E to reject the proposal and he would give him more than 1(so, at least 2). E knows that he would get nothing if he gets A,B and C killed, as D would take 100 for himself and vote for the proposal himself. That would gain him half of the vote and the proposal would be accepted
So, if it comes down to C, he would get a max of 1 coin, as he would choose 1 over 0.
B offers him more than 1. E knows that B is sure to keep his promise as if B offers him 0 coins, there is no way E would accept it and if B offers him 1 coin, he can reject B and move to C’s proposal, where he surely will get 1 coin, and there still a very, very small chance that he gets more than 1.
This can be sure by an example: if a greedy man is given 2 options of boxes, one sure to contain $10 and the other sure to have a minimum of 10, the man would choose the second one as he would not face a loss in comparison to the first one, and would also have a chance to gain a bonus.
So, this shows that to survive, B has to give at least 2 coin to E and would surely do it. C will think all this and come to a conclusion that if B distributes, he would get 0, so it is better to except 1. There is no way E would reject B so B is bound to get accepted and thus he can’t gain more than 1. This secures 1 vote for A
Now thinking all this, A would think that to get E to accept his proposal, A had to give E more than B would give. So, A would offer 3 coins to E and the proposal would be A:B:C:D:E::96:0:1:0:3
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Well i re evaluated my answer, and found out that the original solution given by the site is right. I am very sorry for the inconvenience.
Thank You
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